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Abstract One-tailed statistical tests are often used in ecology, animal behaviour and in most other ﬁelds in the
biologicalandsocialsciences.Herewereviewthefrequencyoftheiruseinthe1989and2005volumesoftwojournals
(Animal Behaviour and Oecologia), their advantages and disadvantages, the extensive erroneous advice on them in
both older and modern statistics texts and their utility in certain narrow areas of applied research. Of those articles
with data sets susceptible to one-tailed tests, at least 24% in Animal Behaviour and at least 13% in Oecologia used
one-tailedtestsatleastonce.Theywereused35%morefrequentlywithnonparametricmethodsthanwithparametric
ones and about twice as often in 1989 as in 2005.Debate in the psychological literature of the 1950s established the
logical criterion that one-tailed tests should be restricted to situations where there is interest only in results in one
direction. ‘Interest’ should be deﬁned; however, in terms of collective or societal interest and not by the individual
investigator. By this ‘collective interest’ criterion, all uses of one-tailed tests in the journals surveyed seem invalid.
In his book Nonparametric Statistics, S. Siegel unrelentingly suggested the use of one-tailed tests whenever the
investigator predicts the direction of a result.That work has been a major proximate source of confusion on this issue,
but so are most recent statistics textbooks.The utility of one-tailed tests in research aimed at obtaining regulatory
approval of new drugs and new pesticides is brieﬂy described, to exemplify the narrow range of research situations
where such tests can be appropriate.These situations are characterized by null hypotheses stating that the difference
or effect size does not exceed, or is at least as great as, some ‘amount of practical interest’. One-tailed tests rarely
should be used for basic or applied research in ecology, animal behaviour or any other science.
Key words: directional tests, hypothesis testing, non-parametric tests, one-sided tests, S. Siegel, signiﬁcance tests.
INTRODUCTIONaec_1946 447..468
For roughly 50 years debate has gone on in the scien-
tiﬁc and statistical literature over the use of one-tailed
statistical tests. The debate has concerned primarily
the criteria for determining when their use is ap-
propriate. The frequency of their use has varied over
time and varies markedly from one scientiﬁc discipline
to another. Periodically, authors have noted their
general inappropriateness. Burke (1953) reported ‘a
disturbing increase in the use of one-tailed tests’ in the
psychological literature following publication of mis-
guided advice from Marks (1951) and Jones (1952).
Fleiss (1987) noted in the medical literature‘a growing
tendency towards using one-tailed signiﬁcance tests in
clinical trials’, a use he regarded as ‘inappropriate’.
Peace (1989, 1991) determined that 34% of experi-
mental medical studies published during 1975–1988
used one-tailed tests and concluded ‘that a sizable
segment of the research community believes that there
are settings where one-sided p values are appropriate’.
In the ﬁelds of ecology and evolution, recent reviews
have claimed (Gaines & Rice 1990; Rice & Gaines
1994) or implied (Underwood 1990, 1997) that one-
tailed tests are not used as often as they should be.
Freedman et al. (1991, 1998) say it doesn’t make
much difference which type of test is used as long as
one makes clear which is used. Many have heeded the
ﬁrst part of that prescription, and many fewer the
second. For example, Feinstein (1974) reported that
‘tailedness’ was not indicated for the ‘vast majority’ of
757 statistical procedures found in 404 articles pub-
lished in 1973 in ﬁve general medical periodicals.
McKinney et al. (1989) observed that of 56 medical
articles using Fisher’s exact test, 59% did not indicate
whether they were using a one- or two-tailed version;
and of 20 psychology articles using the t-test, 85%
neglected to provide this information (Pillemer 1991).
Our own interest in this issue was stimulated initially
by observation of frequent misuse of one-tailed tests
in the animal behaviour and ecological literature.
Unaware of the depth of this tar pit, we undertook to
prepare a short note on it.
In the course of the debate over criteria, many
technical and conceptual issues relating to the
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been raised. Errors concerning these have been pub-
lished in abundance, confused the debate over criteria,
and almost certainly led to publication of many incor-
rectly calculated P values for one-tailed tests. The
objective of this report is to clarify and resolve some
key issues relating to the use of one-tailed tests. In
doing so, we come to the conclusion that their use
in all basic and most applied scientiﬁc research is
inappropriate. Their use is appropriate, however,
in certain types of applied research where the null
hypothesis is other than ‘no effect’ and where the P
values yielded by statistical tests might determine
actions to be taken, as implicit in the Neyman-Pearson
decision theoretic framework for statistical hypothesis
testing.
We begin this analysis by establishing our terminol-
ogy, notation and concepts, by deﬁning the nature of
the central problem and by commenting on a subsid-
iary technical issue, the relationship of P values to
‘directional’ conclusions. We then state what we, and
some others,believe to be the only acceptable criterion
for use of one-tailed tests, that of the collective interest
of science and society.Next we present and analyse the
results of surveys of use of one-tailed tests in two
journals, Animal Behaviour (AB) and Oecologia (OE),
in 1989 and 2005.Then we critique the treatment of
the issue in both older and recent statistics books. In
the ﬁnal sections, we discuss some special types of
applied research where one-tailed tests are quite
appropriate.
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Basic concepts
We have measured the same dependent variable for
two samples a and b, and wish to make an inference
about a difference that might exist between the respec-
tive real or abstract sampling universes, A and B.
Frequently we wish to make an inference about the
difference between the unknown means, mA - mB, on
the basis of the difference between the observed
sample means, mA and mB. If we explicitly deﬁne
d = mA - mB and d = mA - mB, then our interest might
consist in asking whether the true difference departs
from some particular magnitude (d = c?) or whether
the difference exceeds (d > c?) or is less than (d < c?)
some particular magnitude.The difference, c, might be
zero, might be an absolute increment or decrement,
or might be a percentage of one of the means, for
example, mA.To answer any of these three questions a
test or assessment of signiﬁcance, such as provided by
a t-test, is helpful.This calls for establishment of a null
hypothesis (H0) and speciﬁcation of the maximum
acceptable probability (a) of rejecting H0 when the H0
is true. Then one estimates the probability (P) of
obtaining a value of d representing a departure from
H0 that is as extreme as or more extreme than the
observed d.The null hypothesis, H0, is the one that we
must in some sense ﬁnd evidence against in order to
show the tenability of the alternative hypothesis, H1.
The H1 most often includes all possible relations of mA
and mB not anticipated by H0.
In the classical decision theoretic framework, when
P is sufﬁciently small,that is  a the investigator rejects
H0 in favour of H1. If this is carried out and if H0 is in
fact true, however, the investigator is said to commit a
type I error. If the investigator fails to reject H0 when
H1 is true, a type II error is said to occur. Of course no
actual error is made if the investigator withholds judg-
ment in this latter case and does not afﬁrmatively
accept the high P value as evidence in favour of H0
over H1.
Test ‘tailedness’
Our problem begins with the fact that in analysing this
simple two-sample data set we usually would like to
discriminate among the three possible situations:d = c,
d > c and d < c. In virtually all basic research we desire
this discriminatory power. Only in certain narrow
types of applied research, to be discussed at the end of
this article, are we satisﬁed merely with distinguishing
one of these possibilities from the other two taken
collectively.
Let us consider the common situation where c = 0
and any of three different sets of hypotheses can be
analysed with a t-test:
Set 1: H0:d = 0, H1:d   0
Set 2: H0:d   0, H1:d < 0
Set 3: H0:d   0, H1:d > 0
Conventionally, we apply a t-test to Set 1 if we are
interested in detecting any difference, positive or nega-
tive, between mA and mB. Such a test is variously
referred to as a two-tailed, two-sided, or nondirec-
tional test. If our concern is to determine only whether
mA < mB or only whether mA > mB, then we apply a t-test
either to Set 2 or Set 3. Such a test is termed a
one-tailed, one-sided, or directional test. The advan-
tage of a one-tailed test is that, for ﬁxed a, it has
greater power than the two-tailed test for detecting a
difference in the direction tested.
There has long existed some confusion in this
terminology.The reason is that most discussion of the
one-tailed versus two-tailed issue has been carried out
in the context of the t-test. As there is a one-to-one
correspondence, under H0, between the symmetric
t-distribution, centered on t = 0, and the symmetric
sampling distribution of d, centered on d = 0, writers
have been able to be imprecise without penalty.A ‘tail’
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d values, and likewise for the positive half of the
distributions. Critical regions for rejection of null
hypotheses can be deﬁned or seen for either the t- or
the d-distribution.
Confusion can develop when the test statistic is one
such as c
2, which might be used to compare propor-
tions in a 2 ¥ 2 contingency table. For a c
2-test the
critical or rejection region usually occupies only a right
hand portion of the distribution of the test statistic
regardless of which of the three sets of hypotheses
(above) is being tested. As P can range up to 1.0, this
portion can be much larger than is implied by a ‘tail’.
All tests will be ‘1-tailed’ in that the rejection region
will not include the lower or left hand tail of the
distribution of the test statistic (c
2); but the test for Set
1, though not the tests for Sets 2 and 3, will be two-
tailed in relation to the sampling distribution of d.As d
is the parameter of prime interest to the investigator,
we will follow widespread usage and deﬁne one- and
two-tailed tests on the basis of whether or not the null
hypothesis is of the form H0:d   c or H0:d   c (one-
tailed tests) or is of the form H0:d = c (two-tailed test).
One-tailed procedures are available, of course, for a
great variety of other testing situations in addition that
of the two-sample problem. Commonest of these
would be (i) the comparison of a single sample to a
hypothetical standard; (ii) the testing of correlation or
regression coefﬁcients; and (iii) ‘ordered alternatives’
tests where the number of groups or treatments being
compared numbers more than two.The basic concep-
tual issues are the same.
Redeﬁning a and/or H0
Interpretation of the typical one-tailed test should be
straightforward. For example, if H0:d   0, observed
d = -10 and P > 0.50,then one concludes only that d is
very unlikely to be positive. If P is much larger than
0.50, however, it will be evident that d probably is
negative, that is strongly in the direction in which we
supposedly have no interest. For example, if P = 0.98
that tells us that had we used a two-tailed test of H0:d
= 0, we would have obtained P = 0.04.
Confusion sometimes exists as to how such unex-
pected or unpredicted results are to be interpreted.
This reﬂects certain variations in how H0 and a are
deﬁned in one-tailed testing situations.The customary
approach is as outlined above. A strong departure in
the unexpected direction is regarded as possible but of
no interest. What often is not made clear with this
approach is that the deﬁnition of a is not the same as
in the standard two-tailed test. It has changed from
‘the probability of rejecting H0:d = 0 when it is true’ to
‘the maximum probability of rejecting H0:d   0 when
it is true’. In the one-tailed test, the probability of a
type I error will equal a if d = 0 but be less than a if
d < 0.Alpha becomes only an upper bound (e.g. Burke
1953; Meehl 1967).
Occasionally authors imply that when a one-tailed
test has been selected a priori and a result strongly in
the unpredicted direction has been obtained,the result
must be considered a chance outcome and not evi-
dence against the idea that d = 0 (e.g.Glass & Hopkins
1984;Koch & Gillings 1988).Such an interpretation is
rarely appropriate. It would be valid only in those rare
situations where we can justify testing H0:d = 0 with a
one-tailed test on the grounds that it is absolutely
certain that a result in the unpredicted direction is
impossible. In such a situation, the deﬁnition of a
reverts to the standard one; it is no longer merely an
upward bound.
The decision theoretic framework
In the classical decision theoretic framework, one
speciﬁes a priori that a decision will be taken to either
‘reject’ or ‘accept’ H0 and one speciﬁes a, the
maximum probability of a type I error that one is
willing to accept (Neyman & Pearson 1933). If it turns
out that P   a, then we reject H0 and state that the
difference between d and c (the d speciﬁed by H0) is
‘signiﬁcant’. If P > a, we say this difference is ‘not
signiﬁcant’.This framework gives a clear formalization
of the concepts of type I error, type II error and power.
It also is a useful general framework for quality control
procedures and for those rare analyses intended to lead
directly to black-and-white, reject-not reject decisions.
For other types of investigations, including virtually
all basic and most applied scientiﬁc studies, the deci-
sion theoretic framework is deﬁcient as a general one
for the implementation and interpretation of statistical
analyses (Fisher 1960, 1971). The many who have
used it and continue to use it as such have been led,
perhaps often against their own intuition, to irrational
analyses, awkward language and illogical conclusions.
A companion article analyses its weaknesses and their
role in fomenting use of one-tailed tests (Hurlbert &
Lombardi 2009). Following its publication, the deci-
sion theoretic framework developed a large following
among mathematical statisticians, especially in the
USA. Salsburg (1992) claimed that Neyman never
championed that framework after the mid 1930s and
seemingly ‘agreed in principle with most of Fisher’s
criticisms’ of it. In fact Neyman presented the frame-
work in extenso in his textbook (Neyman 1950: 250ff)
and brieﬂy but favourably in a later historical essay
(Neyman 1976).But Fisher’s original,if unclear,argu-
ments against the decision theoretic framework have
received extensive support from statistics scholars for
many decades (Hurlbert & Lombardi 2009).
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To discuss the consequences of the ‘tailedness’ of a
test, we use the decision theoretic framework, despite
its inadequacies for other purposes (Hurlbert & Lom-
bardi 2009), as the language of that framework is
familiar to statisticians and scientists.
All scientists certainly wish to keep the risk of type I
errors low regardless of what value they might indi-
vidually assign to ‘low’ and of the formality of the
procedures they wish to use in the task. The costs of
such errors can include the slowing of advance in
knowledge, decrease in quality and increase in price of
the scientiﬁc literature, economic and other damage
caused by introduction of worthless or unsafe products
or technologies, embarrassment, and so on.
Our principal protection against type I errors comes
from generally selecting for study, only those indepen-
dent variables we regard as likely to have an effect on
or to help explain variation in our dependent variables.
Findings of no effect or no relationship are rarely an
objective, nor can high P values be taken as evidence
that there is no effect. In these situations, then, our
principal concern is to get an acceptably precise esti-
mate of d, not to avoid a type I error. Nevertheless, for
reasons of parsimony and consistency as well as to
anticipate those situations when H0 is true, we do have
to show an acceptably low P value before concluding
H0 is false. And in deﬁning ‘acceptably low’ we come
right back to the idea of ﬁxing a.
In the case of our simple two-sample data set, let us
say we wish to set, for the overall decision procedure,
the maximal probability of a type I error at a = 0.05.
There are various ways in which this a might uninten-
tionally be increased.For example,we could use t-tests
to test separately all three null hypotheses given earlier.
For H0:d = 0 a two-tailed test would be used and for
H0:d   0 and H0:d   0,one-tailed tests would be used.
Logically, of course, if either one-tailed test is carried
out, the two-tailed test is redundant, its outcome con-
taining no information not provided in the one-tailed
test.But there are situations that might tempt the naive
investigator into carrying out two of the three possible
tests in a way that leads to an unacknowledged increase
in the probability of a type I error.
In the most common of these situations the investi-
gator has more interest in one tail of the distribution
than another, for example, more interest in positive
values of d than in negative ones. Perhaps theory or
prior evidence suggests d should be positive, perhaps
only a positive value will validate the investigator’s
most cherished hypothesis, or perhaps only a positive
value will indicate that a new product or process is
superior to an older one.
In any such situation the investigator who under-
stands the concept of type I error faces a mild
dilemma. The investigator’s primary interest might
seem best served by carrying out the one-tailed test
corresponding to H0:d   0. The decision to do that
would appropriately be made before the collection of
data. If d turns out to be positive, the one-tailed t-test
of H0:d   0 will yield a P value equal to exactly half of
the P value that would have been obtained by the
two-tailed test of H0:d = 0 (e.g. at least in the case of a
t-test). This simply reﬂects the fact that, for ﬁxed a,
power to detect a positive d is greater for the corre-
sponding one-tailed test than it is for the two-tailed
test.
The dilemma arises from the possibility that d might
turn out to be negative, that is, of a sign opposite that
anticipated or desired.If the investigator had decided a
priori, and on grounds of primary interest and statis-
tical power, that the one-tailed test for H0:d   0 was to
be used, a later determination that d is negative leaves
four options (Goldfried 1959):
Option 1: Report the value of P (which will be >0.5),
argue or imply that the unexpected result contains
no information that is useful, interesting, or impor-
tant to the investigator, her vaguely deﬁned audi-
ence, or science generally, and that therefore further
statistical testing is not needed. If space permits,
provide all the information needed by readers who
may want to carry out a 2-tailed test.
Option 2: Ignore the ﬁrst value (>0.50) of P obtained
and calculate and report the P value obtained in
carrying out the 2-tailed test on H0:d = 0.If the same
value (ai) is used in each of these two tests,then with
respect to H0:d = 0, the overall a is 1.5 ai, that is
0.075 [= (0.5)(0.1) + (0.5)(0.05)], if ai = 0.05. In
other words, P values will be ‘underestimated’.
We can modify this two-stage decision procedure if
we wish to set overall a at any desired level.This can
be carried out by adjusting the calculated P values
upwards by multiplying them by 1.5. Or we can
achieve exactly the same thing by carrying out both the
one-tailed and the two-tailed test with ai = 2a/3.
The only cost of this decision procedure is slightly
reduced power for detecting differences in the
expected direction.The overall procedure represents a
two-tailed test with unequal apportioning of a to the
two tails of the t-distribution, a procedure that, in
different forms, occasionally has been recommended
though it lacks any logical rationale (S.H. Hurlbert &
C.M. Lombardi 2008, unpub. data).
Option 3: Ignore the ﬁrst value (>0.50) of P obtained
and calculate and report the P value obtained in
carrying out the 1-tailed test for the unexpected
direction, that is, for H0:d   0. If the same value (ai)
is used in each of these two tests, then with respect
to H0:d = 0, we now have an overall a = 2ai, that is,
0.10 if ai = 0.05.This decision procedure is exactly
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where a is apportioned equally between the two tails
of the t-distribution.
The cost of this option is that overall a is doubled
relative to its value in either test considered by itself.
This is true even if d turns out to be in the expected
direction and the prescribed second one-tailed test is
not actually carried out. This doubling of a is pre-
vented if, as a matter of procedure, the P value
obtained for the test in the observed direction is itself
doubled.
Option 4: Acknowledge that there may be a real
difference in the unexpected direction and refrain
from any testing for signiﬁcance. If there is sufﬁcient
interest in testing for a difference in the unexpected
direction, repeat the study, and analyze the new data
with either a 2-tailed test or the other 1-tailed test.
The cost of this option is the time and resources
required to repeat the study. The main beneﬁt is a
truly celestial level of ‘statistical purity’.
We began this section with an investigator who had
decided a priori to use a one-tailed test to test H0:d   0
and who then had to consider what to do when d
turned out negative. Can at this point any general
recommendations be made? We suggest Option 4 will
never be an appropriate one as, except where the cost
of repeating the study is trivial, it represents a great
waste of resources and information. Options 2 and 3
represent different types of two-tailed tests. If either is
selected the investigator is simply admitting that she
should have explicitly speciﬁed use of a two-tailed test
when she began the study. She also is unlikely to be
candid about how her a has been affected.The appro-
priateness of Option 1 will depend entirely on the force
of the arguments in its favour that can be developed for
general classes of situations or for any speciﬁc situa-
tion; rarely, in our opinion, will this force be great.
Before considering those arguments let us review a few
technical matters concerning two-tailed tests.
Referent statement for P?
An important aspect of two-tailed tests was called to
our attention by Kaiser (1960) that had been much
neglected in earlier literature and that has continued
to be neglected by both statisticians and scientists
with only rare exceptions (e.g. Leventhal & Huynh
1996a,b; Harris 1997). One reason for the later
neglect might be that the early part of Kaiser’s paper
contains some Sturm und Drang, exaggerated state-
ments that are not supported by his careful analysis in
the later part of the paper. Moreover, he did not
present his major conclusion clearly.
Kaiser (1960) started by claiming that ‘A correct
interpretation of the traditional two-sided test would
appear to make this classic procedure of essentially
negligible interest’.And a bit later:‘It seems difﬁcult to
imagine a problem for which this traditional test could
give results of interest’.This language will be frighten-
ing to anyone looking back on a career littered with
two-tailed tests!
His central point, however, boiled down to this:
when a classical two-tailed test is carried out,the prob-
ability statement or P value obtained refers only to the
probability, assuming that H0 is true, of obtaining a
|d| as great as or greater than the observed |d| and
not to any conclusion about the sign of d, the direction
of the departure from the null hypothesis. This is
correct. A statement such as ‘There was a signiﬁcant
difference between the means for groups A and B
(P = 0.02)’ is allowable, but one such as ‘There was a
signiﬁcantly higher mean for group A than for group B
(P = 0.02)’ is not. ‘Allowable’, of course, only under
the illogical decision-theoretic framework (Eysenck
1960; Altman 1991, p. 168; Hurlbert & Lombardi
2009) that requires speciﬁcation of a and dictates use
of the ‘signiﬁcant/not signiﬁcant’ terminology.
Kaiser (1960),however,stated this conclusion in too
general terms: ‘We cannot logically make a directional
statistical decision or statement[,] when the null
hypothesis is rejected[,] on the basis of the direction of
the difference in the observed sample means’. Scien-
tists reasonably accept broader meaning for such lan-
guage and will tend to respond: If P from a two-tailed
test is sufﬁciently small and mA > mB, then the conclu-
sion that mA > mB is a logical statistical decision.
Bakan (1966) criticized Kaiser’s paper and central
point, saying it represented ‘reductio ad absurdum’. We
do not agree. Bakan rhetorically asked, ‘If Sample
Mean A is greater than Sample Mean B, and there is
reason to reject the null hypothesis, what other direc-
tion can it [d] reasonably [our emphasis] be?’ Kaiser’s
point, however, was that possibly mA < mB even though
mA > mB and P is low.
To conclude that mA > mB when, in fact, mA < mB, is to
make what Kaiser termed the ‘particularly repugnant’,
‘repulsive’ and ‘nasty error of the third kind’, which he
symbolized with g. An increased probability of this
gamma error is what we risk when we interpret the P
value or probability statement from a conventional
two-tailed test as applying not only to the existence of
a difference but also to the direction of the difference.
Occasionally, it is claimed that the mere use of a
two-tailed test implies the investigator has no interest
in reaching ‘directional’ conclusions (e.g. Ferguson
1971; Braver 1975). It seems likely, however, that
every investigator who has ever carried out a two-tailed
test has been keenly interested in the direction of any
departures from the null hypothesis. The question
raised by Kaiser (1960) is whether we should calculate
P in such a way that it refers to our directional
conclusion. Kaiser recommends that we should.That
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larger part of the full inferential process to objective
procedure and quantiﬁcation.
In contrast, we can acknowledge the massive prece-
dent embodied in the existing literature and continue
to use the classical approach. This requires simply
acknowledging that P values from the two-tailed
tests do not formally apply to the directional
interpretations. It in no way precludes our reaching
‘logical’ conclusions concerning the directions of
departures from null hypotheses.
We suggest the latter approach, unwilling to ﬁght
history. But as can be shown, the difference between
the two approaches is both small and simple.
In practical terms, Kaiser’s (1960) recommendation
consists of what we termed Option 3 in the preceding
section: the carrying out of the two one-tailed tests, or
at least the setting up of this as the formal decision
procedure. If for each test we set the critical a = ai,
then the general procedure is exactly equivalent to a
classical two-tailed test with overall a = 2ai, even
though operationally only one of the one-tailed tests
would be carried out,that where H1 corresponds to the
observed direction of the result.The P value yielded by
such a test can simply be doubled (2P) if we wish our
probability statement to refer to ‘direction’ (Gibbons
& Pratt 1975; Harris 1997).This doubling will not be
a valid procedure, however, if the probability distribu-
tion under H0 for different possible outcomes is not
symmetric, as will often be the case, for example, with
categorical data in asymmetrical contingency tables.
Thus we gain the additional protection against the
‘nasty’ gamma error simply by doubling our risk of a
type I error.This doubling also confers additional pro-
tection against type II errors, the probability of which
is symbolized as b.
Demonstration that the difference between the two
approaches is small requires consideration of the mag-
nitudes of these three types of error (a, b, g). As indi-
cated by Kaiser (1960) and clariﬁed by Peizer (1967),
Shaffer (1972) and Leventhal and Huynh (1996a,b), g
has a maximum value of a/2, which is attained asymp-
totically as d approaches zero, and decreases rapidly as
d becomes larger (g is undeﬁned, of course, when
d = 0). Thus g will always be small, assuming that a
low a is speciﬁed;and if we follow Kaiser’s recommen-
dation (= our Option 3), g will be exactly half what
it will be with the classical two-tailed test. Equiva-
lently, g is equal to the difference in power (1 - b)
between the classical two-tailed test and Option 3. As
d increases, this difference in power approaches zero.
As d decreases, the power of the classical two-tailed
test approaches a. If d is small should we care, for
example, whether 1 - b equals 0.05 instead of 0.025?
Or whether g equals 0.025 instead of 0.0125?
Kaiser (1960) thus brought an interesting matter to
our attention, one that requires us to be careful in
describing the results of two-tailed tests. Abandon-
ment of the classical two-tailed test seems not
required, however. If we insist on having P values that
formally apply to directional conclusions, in most situ-
ations we can simply double the P values yielded by the
two-tailed test. Otherwise we can continue to reach
directional conclusions informally on the basis of the
undoubled P values, agreeing with Schulman (1992)
that the ‘extra risk [of a gamma error] is so small it can
safely be ignored’.
Lest the reader think this is a long dead issue,we cite
ﬁve modern restatements and elaborations of Kaiser’s
thesis. Hand and McCarter (1985) have stated that
‘ordinary two-tailed test[s] of signiﬁcance are com-
pletely useless insofar as practical actions are con-
cerned’ and provide ‘no basis’ for deciding on the sign
of d even when the sign of d is known and P is low.
They recommend Option 3 which they term the
‘directional two-tailed test’. Casella and Berger (1987)
stated that ‘The testing of a point null hypothesis
[e.g. H0:d = 0] is one of the most misused statistical
procedures . . . Few experimenters of whom we are
aware, want to conclude that “there is a difference”.
Rather, they are looking to conclude that “the new
treatment is better”.Thus there is a direction of inter-
est in many experiments and saddling an experimenter
with a two-sided test would not be appropriate’. In
reference to medical research, Peace (1989) claimed
‘that if the [clinical] trial is designed to be conﬁrma-
tory, then the alternative [hypothesis] cannot be two-
sided and still be logical’.
Leventhal and Huynh (1996a) recommended and
thoroughly reviewed the ‘directional two-tailed test’.
They reiterated the claim that conventional two-tailed
tests ‘do not provide for directional decisions’. They
emphasized the importance of considering g while
simultaneously admitting that it will be trivially small
except where a is large and d is small. They gave an
excellent summary of the various options for calculat-
ing power, conﬁdence intervals and minimum sample
sizes and how these relate to the ‘tailedness’ of a test.
But no new arguments were advanced for the ‘direc-
tional two-tailed test’. Moreover, their framework is
the rigid decision theoretic one where a must be speci-
ﬁed, high P values lead to ‘acceptance’ of H0, and the
primary objective is to make an up-or-down decision,
not to evaluate the strength of evidence against H0 or
to estimate the precision of d.
In sum, those authors favouring ‘directional two-
tailed tests’ seem opposed to use of classical one-tailed
tests.They are two-tailers.They differ from those who
suggest the standard two-tailed tests only in the sec-
ondary matter of whether a reported P value should be
that for the tail corresponding to the observed direc-
tion of d or, as is conventional, that for both tails.With
either approach to reporting the P value, logical, direc-
tional decisions are possible.
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(1997) initially seems to be taking a hard line, stating
‘. . . as Kaiser (1960) (ﬁrst?) pointed out, a researcher
who adheres to the two valued logic of the traditional
two-tailed tests can never come to any conclusion
about the direction of the effect tested . . .’ It soon
becomes apparent, however, that Harris’s complaint is
not with two-tailed tests but rather with the pervasive
misinterpretation of them.
What Harris terms ‘three-valued logic’ or ‘three-
alternative null hypothesis signiﬁcance testing’ is the
logic that has always been inherent, albeit often
ignored, in two-tailed tests, standard or ‘directional’
(Tukey 1991; Abelson 1995; Harris 1997; Tryon
2001). The resultant P value and observed sample
means allow one of three conclusions: (i) the differ-
ence between the true or population means is probably
positive; (ii) the difference is probably negative; or (iii)
we don’t have adequate information to make a conﬁ-
dent statement about the sign of the difference –
assuming one exists, as is almost always the case.
On the principled assumption that H0 is false, our
conﬁdence that the sign of the real difference between
two groups has the same sign as the observed differ-
ence between sample means can be measured as
(1 – P/2) (Jeffreys 1939; Oakes 1986).This could also
be expressed as an odds ratio, that is, (1 – P/2)/(P/2).
So if a statistical test for a difference between two
groups yields P = 0.20,and (mA - mB) > 0,then we can
conclude that the odds are 9–1 that mA > mB. This
should give us a sharper sense of the weight that P
values greater than the conventional 0.05 can have.
THE COLLECTIVE INTEREST CRITERION
For ﬁxed overall a, a one-tailed test gives us slightly
greater power of detecting a difference in the direction
tested and zero power for detecting a difference in the
opposite direction.When the latter occurs, the preced-
ing review shows that there is only one valid and
honest way of avoiding the waste of information and
resources that can result from this lack of power: Use
one-tailed tests only in situations where a strong dif-
ference in the untested direction would truly be of no
interest. In such cases, nothing is lost by use of a
one-tailed test and a little additional power is gained.
Such cases rarely occur in either basic or applied
research.
This criterion was implicit in the writings of
Neyman (1937) on one-tailed tests and one-sided esti-
mation, for example, where he referred to ‘frequent
practical cases [where] we are interested only [our
emphasis] in one limit’. Neither he nor many others
who cursorily referred to this idea of ‘interested only’
over the next decades attempted explication of the
criterion or a translation of it into operational terms.
Finally, Kimmel (1957) and then Welkowitz et al.
(1971) and Pillemer (1991), in essays on the general
inappropriateness of one-tailed tests, deﬁned the
matter very clearly. Kimmel stated:
This limitation [zero power of 1-tailed test for an
effect in the direction opposite that tested] cannot be
shrugged off by the comment, ‘We have no interest
in a difference in the opposite direction’. Scientists
are interested in empirical fact regardless of its
relationship to their preconceptions . . . Use a one-
tailed test when results in the unpredicted direction
will, under no conditions, be used to determine a
course of behavior different in any way from that
determined by no difference at all.
This suggests the behaviour of the investigator
would be the operational criterion for assessing
whether she is truly ‘interested only’ in the one direc-
tion tested for. This behaviour would include actions
taken relative to the dissemination of results and to the
manner in which they are described and interpreted.
That we cannot know with certainty the behaviour,
past,present,or future,of individual investigators is no
obstacle to a general prescription.Our extensive obser-
vation of investigators on several continents shows
them all to be gente reviva, folks quick to appreciate
opportunity. ‘[A]lthough the experimenter might be
anticipating, or hoping for, an outcome in one tail of
the distribution,he (or she) will surely not disregard an
extreme result in the opposite tail of the distribution
. . .’ (Upton 1992). In every d associated with a low P
value, regardless of sign, there is a good story. And we
have never known a colleague who shirked at its
telling. Such behaviour is predictable. Editors, review-
ers and statistical consultants should operate on the
assumption that it is universal. They will have to be
prepared, of course, to argue with those (e.g. Royall
1997) who will tell them that it is ‘presumptuous and
condescending’ to assume that researchers will take
note of unexpected results and change their behaviour
in response to them.
More speciﬁcally, we recommend an interpretation
of Kimmel’s criterion that makes the use of one-tailed
tests independent of the idiosyncratically deﬁned and
post hoc reporting of the interests or expectations of
individual investigators. ‘Interest’ should be deﬁned
only institutionally, that is on the basis of the collective
interest of science and society.This need not be carried
out formally by any particular body. It will be enough
that a consensus is reached that in every area of
research, there will always be a collective interest in
knowing of results that are the opposite of those pre-
dicted by or of interest to the original individual
investigators. Exceptions will be so few and so dis-
tinctly sui generis that we can ignore them in our
general prescription that one-tailed tests be avoided.
This ‘collective interest’ interpretation of Kimmel’s
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own arguments opposing the use of one-tailed tests.
The best explications of this ‘collective interest’ cri-
terion we have found are by Welkowitz et al. (1971;
Appendix S1) and Pillemer (1991).
Welkowitz et al. (1971) provided the ﬁrst cogent
textbook treatment of one-tailed tests that we know of.
They stated:
It is our belief, however, that one-tailed tests should
not be used in place of two-tailed tests of
signiﬁcance. One reason for this position is that the
user of one-tailed tests is placed in an embarrassing
position if extreme results are obtained in the direc-
tion opposite to the one expected. . . . [I]n almost
all situations in the behavioural sciences, extreme
results in either direction are of interest. Even if
results in one direction are inconsistent with a given
theory, they may suggest new lines of thought. Also,
theories change over time, but published results
remain immutable on the printed page. Those
perusing the professional journals (perhaps years
after the article was written) should not be bound by
what theory the original researcher happened to
believe . . . [E]xtreme results in the ‘opposite’ direc-
tion invariably have important implications for the
state of scientiﬁc knowledge. . . . If a one-tailed test
is used and results are obtained in the ‘opposite’
direction which would have been signiﬁcant, the
experiment should be repeated before conclusions
are drawn.
We do not believe that it would ever be desirable to
repeat a well-conducted experiment for the sole reason
that the result did not coincide with the investigator’s
expectation. But otherwise the advice of Welkowitz
et al. (1971) on this subject is clearer and wiser than
that offered by any other textbook we know.
That same advice was retained, with only minor
changes in wording, up through the fourth edition of
their text (Welkowitz et al. 1991). In the ﬁfth edition
(Welkowitz et al. 1999), however, they completely
rewrote their section on ‘One-tailed tests of signiﬁ-
cance’ and withdrew from the ﬁeld of battle. They
omitted all the advice quoted above, recast their dis-
cussion in terms of conﬁdence intervals and said
nothing about the appropriateness of one- versus two-
tailed tests. It is difﬁcult to imagine what could have
precipitated such a complete retreat from their earlier
cogently argued position.Doubtless it was one or more
of the attacks of the last 30 years on signiﬁcance
testing by the many critics who have failed to distin-
guish between the useful properties of signiﬁcance
tests on the one hand and the misuse of such tests by
researchers and statisticians on the other.
In December 1999, following some earlier corre-
spondence, we sent the above text to Joan Welkowitz
asking for her appraisal.Though she did not respond,
in the next (sixth) edition the authors (Welkowitz et al.
2006) reinserted a warning against use of one-tailed
tests. Less clear and forceful than the original, it now
reads, ‘Although behavioral researchers often have a
theory that predicts the direction of their results, to be
conservative . . . they usually report their results in
terms of two-tailed tests. . . . Because the research
community does not want to discourage the reporting
of paradoxical ﬁndings, . . . the two-tailed test is the
norm. However, one-tailed tests may be justiﬁed if
the results would make no sense in the opposite
direction . . .’.
In his excellent review of the inappropriateness of
one-tailed tests in educational research, Pillemer
(1991) states:
The criteria for choosing a hypothesis testing strat-
egy should be refocused away from the concerns of
individual scientists and toward the needs [read:
interests] of the broader scientiﬁc community,
present and future . . . . Educational research
should continue to be guided by hypotheses, but a
researcher’s personal beliefs and predictions should
not dictate what outcomes will become a part of
the public record. . . . Researchers should routinely
present . . . exact two-tailed probabilities for all
major statistical comparisons within a study.
Thus we conclude: one-tailed tests are generally
inappropriate.We save for a section at the end of this
article, discussion of certain types of applied research
where the one-tailed test can be a useful tool.
USAGE IN TWO JOURNALS
Method of survey
We now report the results of our survey on the fre-
quency of the use of one-tailed tests in the 1989 and
2005 volumes of the journals AB and OE.We selected
the former journal because of our observation that
misuse of one-tailed tests was widespread in the
animal behaviour literature in general.We selected the
latter for the purpose of making a comparison of
behaviour with ecology, where our impression, based
partly on Hurlbert and White (1993), was that such
misuse was much less common. An earlier version of
this manuscript was based on only the 1989 volumes.
Here we have analysed an additional 585 articles in the
AB and OE volumes for 2005, allowing us to docu-
ment some marked changes in statistical practice over
this 16-year interval.
For every one of the 1169 articles in these four
volumes, we examined the ‘tailedness’ of procedure for
all comparisons of two samples or treatments, all com-
parisons of a sample with a standard or hypothetical
454 C. M. LOMBARDI AND S. H. HURLBERT
© 2009 The Authors doi:10.1111/j.1442-9993.2009.01946.x
Journal compilation © 2009 Ecological Society of Australiavalue, and all one- and two-sample tests of correlation
and regression coefﬁcients.
Many papers used more than one type of statistical
test and often used a given type for two or more data
sets. We examined every individual test reported and
calculated frequency of usage of one-tailed tests on
both per article and per procedure bases. Consider
three articles, one reporting six two-tailed t-tests, a
second reporting three two-tailed t-tests and one one-
tailed t-test and a third reporting one one-tailed and
one two-tailed Fisher’s exact test. For these, the per
article frequency of usage of one-tailed t-tests would
be 67%, and the per procedure frequency of one-tailed
tests would be 50% for the t-test and 100% for Fisher’s
exact test.
The results of the survey are given in Table 1 with
separate tabulations, by journal and year, for the 12
most frequently used statistical procedures where one-
tailed testing was possible. Table 2 summarizes some
of that information, grouping procedures into two cat-
egories, parametric and non-parametric, in order to
illuminate some of the major contrasts of interest.
Of the 248 and 301 articles published in AB in 1989
and 2005, 193 and 243 articles respectively, carried
out statistical tests on at least one data set for which
one-tailed tests were possible. Of the 336 and 284
articles in OE in 1989 and 2005, 187 and 160 articles,
respectively, carried out at least one statistical test on
data for which a one-tailed test was possible.
For assessing difference between journals or years
we have occasionally used, in the following sections,
c
2-tests to compare two percentages. These were all
two-tailed tests, involved 1 degree of freedom, and
only their resultant P values are reported. Fastidious
minds might object to our rustic statistical approach
on grounds that we have, after all, censused four
volumes, not sampled them, and that we have engaged
in extensive ‘pooling’ in reducing data sets to 2 ¥ 2
contingency tables.They are welcome to try alternative
approaches using the the raw data in our Table 1.
Failure to report ‘tailedness’
We ﬁrst note the dismal, though improving, reporting
rate for tailedness.Very often, and in OE more than in
AB, the authors did not indicate, directly or indirectly,
for any of the tests used whether they were one- or
two-tailed. For 1989 and 2005 the respective percent-
ages of articles lacking this information were were 34
and 8 for AB and 65 and 44 for OE. Perhaps animal
behaviourists are more attentive to this detail because
they are more likely than ecologists to regard one-
tailed tests as a valid option.
Rates calculated on a per procedure basis, using the
information given under ‘All uses’ in Table 1, rather
than that under ‘Any test’, also present a grim but
improving picture. For 1989 and 2005 respectively,
tailedness was not determinable for 44% and 29% of
the procedures reported in AB, or for 74% and 57% of
procedures reported in OE. All c
2-tests for both jour-
nals, whether based on numbers of articles or number
of procedures, gave strong evidence the improvement
between 1989 and 2005 was real (P < 0.0001).
We suspect that many of the non-reporting authors
share our point of view, routinely use only two-tailed
tests, and therefore consider speciﬁcation of that fact
superﬂuous.Nevertheless,their silence does somewhat
constrain our analysis, not to mention precise inter-
pretation of their own results. In many cases, however,
supplementary information was provided – such as
critical t-values for a speciﬁed a – that allowed us to
determine ‘tailedness’ even though the author was not
explicit on the point.
Overall frequency of use of one-tailed tests
We ﬁrst consider the overall frequency of use for the
two journals taken together. Of the 193 and 312
articles reporting, for 1989 and 2005 respectively, at
least one test where ‘tailedness’ could be determined,
41% and 21% used one-tailed tests at least once
(Table 1). On a per procedure basis the difference
between use rates is similar, 36% versus 17%, based on
sample sizes of 325 and 427 for the 2 years (Table 2,
bottom).The decline in use seems real by both mea-
sures (P < 0.001).
What if we make the generous assumption that, of
the 187 and 91 articles giving in each year no infor-
mation on the ‘tailedness’ of any of their tests, not one
used a one-tailed test? The usage rates for 1989 and
2005 then drop to 21% and 16%. If we make the even
less reasonable assumption that all of the 187 articles
silent on tailedness did use one-tailed tests, the usage
rates jumps to 70% and 39%. Any ﬁgure in this range
(16–70%) is discouragingly high if these tests are as
inappropriate as we believe them to be.
All the reports were of basic research, though espe-
cially in the case of OE, the research often was
intended to contribute to solution of practical
problems. In no case of one-tailed test usage could the
investigator have been expected to ignore a result
strongly in the direction not tested for. But, no such
results seem to have occurred! Only in a few instances
did authors give a rationale for use of one-tailed tests.
In both 1989 and 2005, there were exactly 13 articles
in which the justiﬁcation given was that a prediction
had been made. In one other case each year the reason
given was that a difference in one of the possible direc-
tions would have been either uninterpretable or of no
interest. Users of one-tailed tests most often select
such tests on the grounds that they have predicted a
priori the direction of a result. With a prediction
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authors must be clairvoyant,be working in areas where
theory is very ‘mature’, or be asking questions the
answers to which are already known.
As one of us is not entirely without sin, having
occasionally during a wild and reckless youth used
one-tailed tests for predicted results (Lombardi &
Curio 1985a,b), we of course cannot be too indignant.
Behaviour versus ecology
Results reported in the rows of Table 1 labeled ‘Any
test’ suggest that, contrary to our initial idea, dif-
ferences between ecologists and behaviourists in
frequency of use of one-tailed tests are slight or
non-existent. In 1989, frequencies for OE and AB
were 45% and 39%, respectively (P = 0.56), whereas
in 2005 they were 16% and 23% (P = 0.66). However,
if we make the not too unrealistic assumption that only
two-tailed tests were used in those papers silent on
‘tailedness’, usage is greater by behaviourists. Calcu-
lated as column C/columnA and column G/column E,
the percentage of papers using one-tailed tests in 1989
was 26% for AB and 16% for OE (P = 0.018), and in
2005 was 21% for AB and 9% for OE (P = 0.0013).
These numbers suggest that, to the extent that these
journals are representative of their ﬁelds, behaviourists
might be using one-tailed tests on the order of 43–62%
more often than are ecologists.
Similar trends are documented when we calculate
rates on a per procedure basis (rows of Table 1 labeled
‘All uses’). No consistent difference is found between
AB and OE in rates of one-tailed test use based solely
on diagnosable uses – 34% versus 44% in 1989 (P =
0.076), and 19% versus 12% in 2005 (P = 0.10). But if
we make the not unrealistic assumption that only two-
tailed tests were used in those procedures where
‘tailedness’ was not indicated, then AB authors seem
to be consistently higher users.Again calculating them
as column C/column A and column G/column E, one-
tailed use rates in 1989 become 17% and 12% (P =
0.041) for AB and OE respectively, and in 2005 be-
come 14% and 5% (P = 0.0005) for AB and OE,
respectively. These might suggest that behaviourists
are using one-tailed tests 45–160% more frequently
than are ecologists.
We note that Hurlbert andWhite (1993) found that
only four of 95 experimental papers by zooplankton
ecologists made use of one-tailed tests. They did not
record, however, the number of these 95 papers where
the ‘tailedness’ of tests was left unspeciﬁed.
In both years there were some striking differences
between AB and OE in the frequency of usage of
particular types of tests. Regression methods were
used more often in OE. Methods for categorical data
were used more often in AB. We believe such differ-
ences simply reﬂect substantive differences between
animal behaviour and ecology in the types of studies
conducted and response variables measured.
Table 2. Summary of changes in frequency of use of one-tailed tests in the1989 and 2005 volumes of Animal Behaviour and
Oecologia, by general category of procedure
Procedure type, journal, year & n
†
% of diagnosable uses
that were one-tailed
% reduction in frequency of
use (P-value, fr c
2-test)
Parametric procedures (r, regression, t, Z, binomial)
Animal Behaviour
1989 (n = 76) 29
2005 (n = 156) 21 28 (0.21)
Oecologia
1989 (n = 51) 33
2005 (n = 77) 12 64 (0.006)
Non-parametric procedures (rs, tau,Wilcoxon, sign, c
2, Fisher’s exact, G)
Animal Behaviour
1989 (n = 149) 36
2005 (n = 156) 17 53 (0.0002)
Oecologia
1989 (n = 49) 47
2005 (n = 38) 13 72 (0.002)
All procedures, both journals
1989 (n = 325) 36
2005 (n = 427) 17 53 (<0.0001)
†Number of articles with at least one diagnosable use of a given procedure, as given in columns B and F in Table 1.An article
with diagnosable uses of three different procedures would contribute an n of 3 to the base from which frequencies in the ﬁrst
column were calculated.
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general type of analysis, AB articles were much more
likely to use non-parametric procedures than were OE
articles (Table 1). Over both years, AB authors used
Wilcoxon tests as frequently as t-tests, whereas OE
authors used t-tests about twice as often as Wilcoxon
tests.AB authors used r about as frequently as rs and t,
but OE authors showed a distinct preference for r.
These differences between AB and OE authors in fre-
quency of usage of speciﬁc types of tests seem real and
not reasonably attributed to sampling error (all tests,
P < 0.05).
Parametric versus nonparametric tests
In 1989, there was a striking tendency in both journals
for the per article frequency of use of one-tailed tests
to be greater for nonparametric methods than for para-
metric ones (Table 1, columns D and H).When data
for the two journals are combined, we ﬁnd one-tailed
tests being used 31% of the time with r and 57% of the
time with rs and t.We ﬁnd one-tailed tests being used
31% of the time with t-tests and 44% of the time with
Wilcoxon tests. Calculated over only these two catego-
ries of tests, the frequencies of one-tailed usage are
31% for the parametric procedures and 48% for the
nonparametric procedures (P = 0.018).
This pattern was not observed in 2005 (Table 1,
columns D and H). Combining data for both journals,
one-tailed tests were used 26% of the time with r and
30% with rs and t (P = 0.74). Also we ﬁnd one-tailed
tests being used 18% of the time with t-tests and 16%
of the time withWilcoxon tests (P = 0.76).The differ-
ence between the overall frequencies of one-tailed
usage for these parametric procedures (20%) and the
corresponding nonparametric ones (21%) now seems
to disappear.
A similar contrast between 1989 and 2005 is seen
when rates on a per procedure basis are examined,
using data in Table 2.When data for the two journals
are combined, one-tailed tests were used 39% of the
time with non-parametric procedures and 31% of the
time with parametric ones (P = 0.13) in 1989 whereas
the corresponding rates were 16% and 18% (P = 0.31)
in 2005.
A rational explanation of why one-tailed tests would
be considered appropriate perhaps 27–55% more
often with nonparametric procedures than with para-
metric ones in 1989, but were considered appropriate
at about the same rate in 2005 eludes us. If almost all
use of one-tailed tests in basic research is irrational;
however, perhaps it is not surprising to ﬁnd, in the
patterns of that use, further evidence of irrationality.
The historical roots of this problem are identiﬁed in
the bibliographies of the AB and OE authors, as we
now discuss.
Proximate sources of error
Most of the AB and OE articles list no statistics book
in their bibliographies.Those that do, cite three books
– Siegel (1956; Siegel & Castellan 1988), Sokal and
Rohlf (1969, 1981, 1995) and Zar (1974, 1984, 1999)
– far more than they do any others (Table 3).The last
two of these are among the statistics books most widely
used by biologists generally.The misprescriptions in all
these books likely are a major cause not only of the
misuse of one-tailed tests but also of the particular
Table 3. Statistics books most frequently cited by articles in Animal Behaviour and Oecologia in 1989 and 2005
Book
Number of articles citing book
1989 2005
Animal Behaviour Oecologia Animal Behaviour Oecologia
(n = 248) (n = 336) (n = 301) (n = 284)
Sokal and Rohlf (1969, 1981, 1995) 37 50 25 20
Siegel (1956), Siegel and Castellan (1988) 23 4 13 1
Zar (1974, 1984, 1999) 6 13 17 15
Snedecor (1956), Snedecor and Cochran (1967, 1980) 6 8 0 0
Conover (1980) 6 2 1 1
Winer et al. (1962, 1971) 2 6 0 0
Hollander and Wolfe (1973) 4 1 0 0
Steel and Torrie (1960, 1980), Steel et al. (1997) 1 4 0 1
Martin and Bateson (1986, 1993) 3 0 11 0
Cohen (1977, 1988) 0 0 9 1
Scheiner and Gurevitch (1993) – – 1 6
Crawley (1993) – – 4 1
Underwood (1997) – – 1 4
Only books listed are those which had at least four entries in at least one cell of this table.
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If the blame falls on few shoulders,this is not to say the
poor, bewildered behaviourists and ecologists would
easily have found better advice elsewhere. Of 52 sta-
tistics books examined by us, 40 give vague, inconsis-
tent, or simply bad advice as to when one-tailed tests
are permissible (Appendix S1).The primary literature
on the topic is equally confused.
With respect to one-tailed tests, the ﬂaws of these
three books cited above are easily summarized. All
suggest the use of one-tailed tests when the investiga-
tor predicts or thinks they know in what direction a
result will lie (Table 4;Appendix S1).All except Siegel
(1956) additionally accept their use when there is
‘interest only’ in a result in one particular direction.
They thus ignore the critical conﬂict between these
two criteria:prediction of the direction of a result in no
way implies lack of interest, collective or individual, in
a result in the contrary direction. All apply one-tailed
tests to many data sets where results in the unpre-
dicted direction would have been of deﬁnite interest to
science (e.g. Table 4, columns B and C). Zar pushes
one-tailed tests especially hard. In his 2004 edition,
though he has no main entry in his index for one-tailed
tests, he in fact discusses and gives examples of them
in at least 23 different places.Few other modern books
so effectively confer unmerited legitimacy on use of
one-tailed tests in biology.
None of these three books discusses what should or
could be carried out when, after deciding to use a
one-tailed test, a result in the direction opposite that
expected is obtained. Should the investigator select
Option 1, 2, 3, or 4?
The widespread reliance on these books seems to
explain rather fully the widespread misuse of one-
tailed tests, especially by animal behaviourists for
whom Siegel (1956) has long been a favourite refer-
ence (Table 3;Martin & Bateson 1986,1993).And the
fact that Siegel (1956) was the ﬁrst compendium of
non-parametric methods to be published and has been
the most widely used one for a few decades,clearly can
account for the more frequent use of one-tailed tests
with non-parametric than with parametric procedures.
There is no statistics book that suggests the use of
one-tailed parametric procedures as insistently as
Siegel (1956) suggests the use of one-tailed non-
parametric procedures, although Zar (1999, 2004)
comes close, presenting approximately 15 examples
using one-tailed parametric procedures.
1989 versus 2005: on the road to recovery?
The labor of having added data for 2005 to this article
has been rewarded, ﬁnally, by some good news! Use of
one-tailed tests decreased between 1989 and 2005 by
Table 4. Comparison of three statistics books with regard to erroneous recommendations and statements concerning one-
tailed tests using procedures for categorical data
A B C D E
Reference & test Pages
Tailedness of
example
Contrary result in
1-tailed example
likely to be of
interest?
Authors imply
region of rejection
should be 2-tailed
for 2-tailed test?
Total number
of errors
Siegel (1956)
Binomial (1 ¥ 2 tables) 36–40 1-tailed yes yes
†
Fisher’s exact 96–104 1-tailed yes yes
†
c
2 (2 ¥ 2 tables) 107–109 1-tailed yes yes 8
Median (c
2) 111–116 1-tailed yes yes
McNemar (c
2) 63–67 1-tailed yes yes
Siegel & Castellan (1988)
Binomial (1 ¥ 2 tables) 39–42 1-tailed yes yes
†
Fisher’s exact 103–111 1-& 2-tailed yes yes
†
c
2 (2 ¥ 2 tables) 116–117 2-tailed NA no 4
Median (c
2) 124–128 1-tailed yes yes
McNemar (c
2) 75–80 2-tailed NA no?
Sokal and Rohlf (1981)
Binomial (1 ¥ 2 tables) 77–79 1-tailed yes
‡ yes
†
G (2 ¥ 2 tables) 732–738 2-tailed NA no
c
2 (1 ¥ 2 tables) 700–701 2-tailed NA no 1
‡
c
2 (2 ¥ 2 tables) 743 2-tailed NA no
Fisher’s exact 738–743 2-tailed NA yes
†
McNemar (G) 769–770 2-tailed NA no
Except where otherwise noted, each ‘yes’ in columns C and D of this table signiﬁes an error.
†The implication is correct in this
case.
‡Same error present in 1995 edition. NA, not applicable.
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seen by comparing the 1989 rows labeled ‘Any test’ or
‘All uses’ with those for 2005. In Table 2, it is shown
that the decrease was found in both AB and OE for
both parametric and non-parametric procedures.This
large decrease might help explain why certain con-
trasts (e.g. AB vs. OE, parametric vs. non-parametric
procedures) that were clear in the 1989 data were
different or less clear in the 2005 data.
There was also some improvement in the frequency
with which authors made clear whether they were
using a one- or two-tailed procedure. See the column
B/column A and column F/column E ratios in Table 1.
As we stated at the beginning of this article, accurate
assessment of frequency of use of one-tailed tests is
hindered when ‘tailedness’ for any fraction of uses is
unclear.Thus some of the apparent decrease in use of
one-tailed tests could be an artefact resulting from
two-tailed procedures being more frequently identiﬁed
as such in 2005 than in 1989.There is no way to know.
Most AB and OE authors continued to cite no sta-
tistics text in 2005, just as in 1989.There were some
interesting shifts in which texts were cited in the
2 years,including a large decrease in citations of Siegel
(1956); Siegel and Castellan (1988), despite the avail-
ability of the second edition. But these shifts repre-
sented a shifting among unreliable texts on the issue,
not a shift from use of unreliable to reliable ones.
Some of the 1989–2005 reduction in use of one-
tailed tests might have been the result of pre-
publicationcirculationofthisarticle.Differentversions
of it have been in circulation since 1994. Numerous
editors, editorial board members, statisticians and
other scientists have received copies or reviewed it in
ofﬁcial or unofﬁcial capacities, many offering helpful
suggestions, several offering praise and a few offering
signs of extreme consternation!These include: Patrick
Bateson,EmiliGarcía-Berthou,C.RayChandler,Peter
Chapman, Boyd Collier, Eberhard Curio, Richard B.
Darlington, Juan D. Delius, Fred C. Dyer, Joseph
Fleiss,Janneke Hoekstra,Douglas H.Johnson,Sam K.
Kachigan, Manfred Milinski, Karl S. Peace,Thorsten
Reusch, Michael Riggs, F. James Rohlf, Jennifer L.
Shaw, Stephen M. Smith, Robert R. Sokal, Clayton L.
Stunkard,Sandra L.Vehrenkamp,Meredith J.West and
several anonymous reviewers. It is also possible, of
course, that even though they were not citing them in
their articles, authors during the 1989–2005 time
period were increasingly inﬂuenced by those few texts
giving good advice on this issue (e.g. Fleiss 1986;
Altman 1991; Welkowitz et al. 1991; Schulman 1992;
Bart et al. 1998; see below).
RELIABILITY OF MODERN TEXTS
Change in texts must come more slowly. It is evident
that the overall quality of advice on one-tailed testing
remains exceedingly poor in both older and newer
statistics books. This is documented in Appendix S1
which presents verbatim the advice given by 52 statis-
tics books as to when one-tailed tests should or might
be used. In that table, these books are categorized into
sombreros blancos (white hats, n = 12) which give rea-
sonable advice, sombreros negros (black hats, n = 15)
which give bad advice and sombreros grises (gray hats,
n = 25) which give vague, inconsistent or mixed
advice.
Advice aimed at behavioural scientists is particularly
unhelpful. We already have discussed the ﬁrst three
books in Table 3.The widely used and, in many ways,
excellent primer on methodology for behaviour studies
by Martin and Bateson (1986, 1993) was a strong
force for inappropriate use of one-tailed tests. It
praised Siegel (1956) as a ‘bible’ for behaviourists, and
championed prediction of result as justiﬁcation for
one-tailed testing. It also recommended ﬁve other
advanced statistics books, all of which either accept
prediction of result as justiﬁcation for one-tailed
testing (e.g. Snedecor & Cochran 1980; Sokal & Rohlf
1981; Zar 1984) or are vague on the matter (Conover
1980; Meddis 1984).
In their second edition Martin and Bateson (1993)
noted that ‘The inappropriate use of one-tailed tests
is one of the most common statistical malpractices in
the behavioural literature’. This statement apparently
referred, however, only to the a posteriori selection of
one-tailed tests.They continued to recommend use of
one-tailed tests when the direction of a result is pre-
dicted beforehand. In their third edition, Martin and
Bateson (2007) no longer refer to Siegel (1956) as the
‘bible’. But unfortunately they do refer to Siegel and
Castellan (1988) as ‘Probably still the best single text
on non-parametric methods; clear, concise, reliable
and indispensable’, and still recommend one-tailed
tests ‘when knowledge or theory predicts the direction
of the difference’.
Several other texts aimed in part at behavioural sci-
entists (Ferguson 1971; Hays 1981; Kirk 1982; Glass
& Hopkins 1984; Darlington & Carlson 1987) also
give advice on this topic that conﬂicts with the collec-
tive interest criterion (Appendix S1). Moreover, this
is true of the journal AB itself. Its ‘Instructions to
authors’ (Animal Behaviour 2004) refer authors to
Kimmel (1957) as an authority on the matter of one-
tailed tests.They then negate that useful advice by also
stating that one-tailed tests are justiﬁed anytime ‘there
are strong a priori reasons for predicting the direction
of a difference . . .’ – which, of course, is much of the
time and a direct contradiction of Kimmel’s advice.
Of the 12 books we have classiﬁed, with some liber-
ality, as sombreros blancos, only Welkowitz et al. (1971,
1991) is bold enough to state that one-tailed tests
should never be used and gives the full rationale for
that position. Fleiss (1981, 1986), Schulman (1992)
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suggest the‘interest only’criterion and also discuss the
rationale underlying it (Appendix S1). Another posi-
tive model for textbooks of the future would be that of
Altman (1991) who states, ‘One-sided tests are rarely
appropriate. . . . Two-sided P values will be used
throughout this book, and I recommend that they are
used routinely’.
Most other books in the sombrero blanco category
state the ‘interest only’ criterion but with the implica-
tion that only the ‘interest’ of the individual investiga-
tor need be considered.Some state the criterion clearly
but then muddy the water with questionable examples.
Helsel and Hirsch (1992), for example, suggest the
‘interest only’ criterion (Appendix S1), and then list
several situations where they believe a one-tailed test
would be appropriate. These situations, however, are
ones where a result in either direction would be of
deﬁnite interest, even if hopes, predictions, or expec-
tations might lie in a single direction. For example,
they say a one-tailed test would be appropriate to test
whether a new sewage treatment plant reduced nutri-
ent loads in plant efﬂuent. Certainly every party con-
cerned with such a plant would be hopeful that it
would accomplish such a reduction; but they also
would be highly interested if it increased nutrient
loads.Those responsible for the design and construc-
tion of the plant might prefer only the optimistic one-
tailed test, but the taxpayers and city council should
insist on the two-tailed one!
Hawkins (2005) likewise recommends ‘avoiding
one-tailed tests like the plague’ but then gives as an
example of an ‘exceptional reason’ justifying a one-
tailed test, a situation where ‘you were testing a cancer
drug and were absolutely sure the drug would not
decrease survival . . .’ (Appendix S1). But severe side
effects of experimental cancer drugs are common, and
surely if the facts in such a case turned out to contra-
dict the a priori ‘absolute’ certainty, there would be a
sudden shift in interest and focus.
APPROPRIATE USAGE
If, by the collective interest criterion, a one-tailed test
is appropriate, then we recommend that by all means
such a test be used. In contrast, a necessarily post hoc
declaration in a manuscript that ‘interest’ was ‘only’ in
a difference in the observed direction is not itself
sufﬁcient to establish ‘appropriateness’. The general
subject matter and nature of the study must them-
selves make it evident to a rational skeptic that a strong
result in the unpredicted direction, if it had occurred,
would not have resulted in a sudden change of ‘inter-
est’ and that a revised testing procedure would not
have been of interest to the scientiﬁc community or to
society at large.
If the probability distributions of all test statistics
were symmetric, like those for t or like those for sym-
metric contingency tables, and if exact P values always
were reported, there would be no need for explicitly
one-tailed tests. Their P values, when desired, could
always be determined by dividing in two those yielded
by two-tailed tests.These two conditions often do not
obtain, however. So if a one-tailed test is justiﬁed, then
the best general practice will be to report the P values
speciﬁc to such a test.
Drug-testing
Are one-tailed tests generally appropriate for applied
research,as many writers have implied?We believe not.
That books aimed at such researchers make heavy
use of one-tailed examples, we regard as unfortunate.
For most applied research, as for virtually all basic
research, a speciﬁc P value by itself is not the basis for
taking or not taking some speciﬁc action. It is only
used in a subjective fashion to help us decide what we
might conclude about d and the phenomena it bears
on.We might be primarily interested in testing for the
superiority of a new drug, educational technology, or
manufacturing process. But if an experiment shows
that this new candidate is actually inferior to the old
standard, then that is not information we want to
ignore. As Fleiss (1986, 1987) points out in connec-
tion with drug testing, such a result might suggest that
something was wrong with the theory or logic that led
up to the experiment and that a new question or phe-
nomenon needs to be investigated. Publication of such
an unexpected result can also serve as a warning or
idea-generator for other scientists.
The domain of research where one-tailed tests are
truly appropriate and useful consists of those testing
situations where the P value or conﬁdence interval
obtained will directly inﬂuence an action to be taken.
These usually will be situations where small dif-
ferences, however real, will not be of practical
signiﬁcance. ‘Smallness’, of course, would be deﬁned
only in relation to each particular context.Thus we will
be interested in testing null hypotheses of the form
d   c or d   c, where c   0. As long ago suggested by
Hodges and Lehmann (1954), ‘we would test that . . .
means do not differ by more than an amount speciﬁed
to represent the smallest difference of practical
interest’. If they are found to do so, with some speci-
ﬁed level of conﬁdence (1 - a), then one action is
taken. If this condition is not met, another action is
taken. In practice, the ‘action’ usually is not taken by
the scientist(s) who carried out the research and sta-
tistical analysis. Rather it is taken by a government
regulator,a vice-president for product development,or
some other such decision-maker. Let us consider two
types of situation.
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be argued that the drug should not be approved or
marketed unless it shows some minimum degree of
efﬁcacy or of superiority over a placebo or over an
existing drug. Medically, the argument might be that
this serves as a counterweight to negative side effects,
both known and unknown; or it might be that public
health in general is negatively affected by having many
drugs of similar efﬁcacy on the market. For a pharma-
ceutical company, if a new drug is only 10% more
efﬁcacious than its old one, it might not make eco-
nomic sense to set up a new production operation and
marketing programme for that drug; better, perhaps,
to continue research on new compounds until one
giving greater improvement in efﬁcacy is found.
Let’s say that a government agency decrees that new
drugs for viral inﬂuenza must bring about, in clinical
trials, a cure rate (mT) at least 20% greater than that
(mC) in a placebo treatment. Two one-tailed testing
procedures are available for this situation. In one, we
set H0:mT < mC and require that P < a and that
dmin   0.2, where dmin = (mT - mC)/mC, in order for
approval to be given.In the other,we set H0:mT < 1.2mC
and require only that P < a in order for approval to be
given. The second approach is more conservative in
that it makes approval practically impossible if the
drug increases the cure rate by only 20% or slightly
more. Using a much higher a in the second than in the
ﬁrst approach will cause some convergence in the
results of the two approaches.
The two approaches are similar in that the burden of
demonstrating sufﬁcient efﬁcacy is placed on the
company. This is the conventional situation. If the
company scientists do not use sufﬁcient replication or
do not adequately control extraneous variables, the
null hypothesis will not be rejected even though
mT >> 1.2 mC.
The appropriateness of a one-tailed test derives from
the fact that, with either approach, the decision
maker’s interest, though possibly not that of the scien-
tists, does truly lie in only one direction. With the
second approach it also derives from the fact that the
‘opposite direction’, that speciﬁed by the null hypoth-
esis, includes not only mT = mC and mT < mC but also
1.2 mC > mT > mC. Thus a two-tailed test of H0:mT =
1.2 mC would not yield a P value pertinent to the unex-
pected observation that mT < mC, a result of possible
interest at least to the scientists. If further exploration
of such an unexpected observation is desired, a two-
tailed test of H0:mT = mC can be applied to the same
data and will yield a P value helpful to that exploration.
As indicated by complaints (e.g. Peace 1988) about
the U.S. Federal Drug Administration’s insistence on
two-tailed tests, the above application of one-tailed
tests in medical or pharmaceutical research is
uncommon. Both researchers and regulators focus on
the null hypothesis of no effect. As Overall (1991)
notes, ‘the issue of magnitude has been resolved in
favour of statistical signiﬁcance, because it is essen-
tially impossible to achieve agreement concerning
how small a treatment effect must be to be
inconsequential’.
Noninferiority and equivalence trials
One tailed tests also prove useful in a relatively new
area of statistical interest called ‘noninferiority’ and
‘equivalence’ trials. Good recent discussions of con-
cepts and problems in this area include those of
Pocock (2000), Barker et al. (2001), D’Agostino et al.
(2003), FDA (2003), Welleck (2003), Tempelman
(2004), Tamayo-Sarver et al. (2005) and Piaggio et al.
(2006). Such trials have been of interest primarily to
medical researchers, but can have applications in the
environmental sciences and other ﬁelds as well (e.g.
EPA 1989; McBride 1999; Manly 2003; Welleck
2003).
A new drug is proposed for a condition or disease for
which there is already an approved and effective drug
on the market.The manufacturer of the new drug can
reasonably request that it be approved by the regula-
tory authorities if it can be showed that it is‘at least not
inferior’ to the older drug by more than some prede-
termined margin of error or margin of inferiority.This
older drug might be produced by the same manufac-
turer or by a different one; it might also be simply a
new formulation or method of delivery of the old drug.
If effectiveness of the new drug or formulation and the
old one are compared in a randomized trial, testing for
non-inferiority could, in principle, be carried out via
a one-tailed test of a null hypothesis of the form
H0:d   c where c is positive and where d is the margin
of inferiority, the maximum allowable amount by
which outcomes for patients under the new drug could
be worse than those for patients under the old drug.
Use of a placebo control group in such a trial usually
would be unethical and not allowed, given that
patients in the placebo treatment would be denied the
proven beneﬁts of the older drug.
However, at present the margin of inferiority is
usually deﬁned in terms not of the difference in patient
outcomes between the new and old drug treatments
but rather in terms of the difference between (or ratio
of) the actual respective effect sizes of the new and old
drugs relative to placebo controls. Non-inferiority is
determined by a signiﬁcance test or by whether a con-
ﬁdence interval about that difference or ratio extends
below an arbitrarily set value. The actual effect sizes
can only be estimated – with much uncertainty and
trepidation – using patient response data from a true
placebo or control group in an earlier study.That study
naturally will have been one carried out in a different
time and place and with at least a slightly different
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metic is easy, but the conclusions reached are heavily
determined by subjective decisions concerning the
values of ‘margin of inferiority’ and a that are used in
calculations and by how different response or patient
outcome variables are weighted relative to each other.
Equivalence or bioequivalence trials involve consid-
erations, decisions and complications similar to those
of non-inferiority trials. Equivalence trials aim at dem-
onstrating that a new drug or a new preparation or
formula of an old one is medically or pharmaceutically
neither superior nor inferior to an old one. Analysis is
by way of two different one-tailed tests or a conﬁdence
interval about a ratio or difference between two effect
sizes. Equivalence trials can be more useful in phar-
macokinetic studies than in clinical ones. The FDA
(2003) deﬁnes bioequivalence as, ‘the absence of a
signiﬁcant difference in the rate and extent to which
the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceu-
tical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives
becomes available at the site of drug action when
administered at the same molar doses under similar
conditions in an appropriately designed study’. It is
important that the active ingredient reach the liver, for
example, not only in adequate quantities but also not
in excessive, possibly damaging quantities.
Given their complexities, it is not surprising the
non-inferiority and equivalence trials are not yet
common, are often inadequately described, and
inspire reviewers to comments, such as ‘It is not our
intent to promote noninferiority or equivalence trials:
the design should be appropriate to the question to be
answered’ (Piaggio et al. 2006).
Ecotoxicology
Toxicology is another ﬁeld where ingenious use of
one-tailed tests or one-sided conﬁdence intervals has
begun to be made by scientists and regulatory
agencies. However, the statistical concern in testing
the effects of, say, a pesticide, food additive, or pollut-
ant is rather different than in the case of a new drug:
we are now concerned that an effect not exceed some
speciﬁed magnitude.
Two common testing situations are (i) where one
wishes to estimate the effect of a speciﬁed dose or
concentration, for example, of a pesticide; and (ii)
where one wishes to estimate the dose that will
produce an effect of some speciﬁed magnitude. The
role that one-tailed testing can play in these contexts is
a topic of a growing literature. Important papers
include those of Crump (1984), Hoekstra and van
Ewijk (1993a,b) and Stunkard (1994).
The ﬁrst of the above types of testing situations
might arise when it has been determined, for example,
that a new insecticide, applied at c kg ha
-1 will achieve
a satisfactorily high kill of mosquito larvae in standing
water habitats. Before use of the insecticide at that rate
can be ofﬁcially approved, however, it is necessary to
show that it will not cause unacceptably adverse effects
on selected non-target elements of the biota or stan-
dard test species. Depending on the particular species
and response variable (e.g. population size, reproduc-
tive rate, survival rate, etc.), it might be appropriate to
specify that the proposed application rate (c kg ha
-1,or
comparable concentration appropriate for a beaker or
microcosm experiment) not cause more than a 20%
reduction in the response variable relative to its value
in a control treatment. That is, we require that mT >
0.80 mC.
There are two approaches to testing whether that
proposition is true (Stunkard 1994). The classical
approach would be to let H0:mT   0.8 mC and
H1:mT < 0.8 mC and to reject H0 only if P   a. This
approach is counterproductive relative to the regula-
tory objective, however. It encourages weak experi-
mental design and increases the chance that the
insecticide will be approved even if mT < 0.8 mC. The
pesticide manufacturer, which is often in charge of
conducting the test, has an incentive to use few repli-
cate experimental units per treatment and to exercise
little control over extraneous variables.This will favour
high P values and conclusions, such as ‘the insecticide
did not cause survival rate to decrease signiﬁcantly
more than 20%’ – even when the data might show that
mT << 0.8 mC.
The simple solution to the above is to simply reverse
the null and alternative hypotheses. Then we have
H0:mT   0.8 mC and H1:mT > 0.8 mC. That is we start
with the presumption that there will be an unaccept-
ably adverse effect, and require the manufacturer to
provide strong evidence (P   a) that the presumption
is false before granting approval to the insecticide. If it
is true that mT > 0.8 mC, then the manufacturer will be
rewarded by setting up an experiment with a strong
design and high power: If, in contrast, mT < 0.8 mC, the
chance of approval is extremely low and society is
afforded the protection the regulations are aimed at
providing. Moreover, although in this case greater
power is of no value to the manufacturer, neither is it
disadvantageous. There is no disincentive to strong
design and high precision. Be the experiment strong or
weak, P will be high and the insecticide will not be
approved.
Rigid and unimaginative use of this approach can be
unproductive for both the manufacturer and society,
however. As a colleague reminds us, large ﬁeld experi-
ments on pesticide effects can be well-designed,
extremely expensive, and still have low precision
(P. Chapman 1993, pers. comm.). Thus even when
mT >> 0.8 mC, these experiments can fail to secure ofﬁ-
cial approval of the pesticide, just as when the conven-
tional test procedure is used and mT >> mC,they can fail
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possible solutions are evident: increase precision by
the ‘brute force’ and expensive approach of markedly
increasing replication; improve designs and protocols
in ways that might increase precision with no or little
additional expense; or set a at a higher value than the
bureaucratically overfavoured one of 0.05. This last
possibility merits discussion among ecotoxicologists.
Why should it not be sufﬁcient, that mT > 0.8 mC and
P < 0.25 when H0: mT   0.8 mC?
In the other testing situation mentioned, we wish to
estimate the dose or concentration of the substance
likely to cause a particular magnitude of effect. Classic
examples are the estimation of LD50 (lethal dose) and
EC50 (effective concentration) values, the concentra-
tions which, during a speciﬁed time interval, cause a
50% reduction in survival or in some other character-
istic of test population.These values are useful mainly
as indicators of the relative toxicity of different sub-
stances, or the relative sensitivity of different species.
One-tailed tests and one-sided conﬁdence intervals
have no special use relative to them.
More recently, scientists and regulatory agencies
have begun using experimentally determined dose
response curves to estimate the dose or concentration
of a substance which will have either no adverse effect
or an adverse effect not greater than some speciﬁed,
acceptably small (e.g. reduction of 1% or 10%)
magnitude.These are known under various acronyms,
such as LOEC or LOEL (lowest observed effect level),
NOEC or NOEL (no observed effect level), EC10
(concentration causing a 10% reduction in the
response variable), etc., and are already used for deci-
sion making by regulatory agencies.Yet some of these
have undesirable statistical properties equivalent to
those described above for testing the acceptability of
an insecticide’s effect with H0: mT   0.8 mC rather than
with H0:mT   0.8 mC. The weaker the experimental
design, for example, the higher will be the estimated
NOEL and the more likely the NOEL will be a con-
centration at which actual effects will be appreciable
(Crump 1984; Hoekstra & Van Ewijk 1993a,b; Crane
& Newman 2000).
A solution to this problem is found in Crump’s
(1984) Benchmark Dose (BD) and Hoekstra andVan
Ewijk’s (1993a,b), Bounded Effect Concentration
(BECx). These are identical conceptually and differ
only in their manner of calculation.They are deﬁned as
the concentration that will cause, at most, an X%
reduction in the variable of interest. They are calcu-
lated from dose-response data by ﬁrst estimating the
ECx and then calculating a conﬁdence interval about
that value. The BD or BECx is deﬁned as the lower
bound of that interval.This BECx, usually divided by
some safety factor, then becomes the maximum con-
centration that will be considered acceptable in a given
environmental situation.This is essentially a one-sided
procedure, regardless of whether the BECx is deﬁned
as the lower bound of a two-sided (1-a) conﬁdence
interval or that of a one-sided (1–2a) conﬁdence
interval.
There will be continued discussion as to the best
way to calculate both ECx and its conﬁdence interval.
Conceptually, the general approach seems ﬂawless,
however. From the point of view of a pesticide manu-
facturer, for example, it rewards strong design and
precision.These raise the value of BD or BECx to as
close to ECx as is desired. Greater precision thus
increases the maximal environmental concentration
that will be considered acceptable and favours
approval by the regulatory agency. This assumes, of
course, that the regulatory agency does not arbitrarily
respond to rising BECx values by lowering X or a or
by increasing the safety factor!
The one-tailed test or one-sided conﬁdence interval
clearly has genuine utility in pharmaceutical and
ecotoxicological decision-making situations, such as
those described above. It is apparent, however, that
these situations are atypical not only of basic research
but also of most sorts of applied research as well.
Certainly in the ﬁelds of ecology and animal behav-
iour, the original focus of our investigation, situations
where one-tailed tests will be appropriate and useful
are vanishingly rare.
A NOTE ON BAYESIAN APPROACHES
Given their increasing use,we offer a few comments on
how one-tailed tests would be handled by Bayesian
methods. The Bayesian version of a one-tailed test
would proceed as follows. First, one would have to
deﬁne a prior probability of zero for all possible results
in the unpredicted direction. Then one would state a
prior for H0, and typically one much higher than 0.0 is
recommended despite near universal agreement that
in almost all testing situations the null hypothesis of
‘no difference’ is false. The remainder of the prior
probability distribution is then deﬁned in a subjective
and largely arbitrary manner for the set of conceivable
results. And ﬁnally the posterior probabilities of H0
and H1 are calculated.
By some reports, Bayesian methods would seem
about to replace more classical frequentist procedures.
For example, it is stated that 30% of the 2001–2005
articles in the Journal of the American Statistical Asso-
ciation concern Bayesian statistics (Wagenmakers &
Grunwald 2006) and that ‘Bayesian inference is fast
becoming an accepted statistical tool among ecolo-
gists’ (Ellison 2004).
We believe, however, that such claims exaggerate the
value of Bayesian methods for the commonest data
analysis situations.The literature on Bayesian statistics
has a surfeit of inclarities and errors well beyond the
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Problems include: the usual widespread confusion
over the distinction between statistical hypotheses and
scientiﬁc hypotheses; failure to recognize that inferen-
tial methods in most disciplines are useful mainly,
albeit implicitly, for purposes of estimation; a focus on
uncommon types of testing situations, such as a com-
parison of a point null and a point alternative hypoth-
esis; claims of ‘objectivity’ based on highly biased prior
probabilities, as when the H0 of ‘no effect’ is assigned
a prior of 0.5; and, most generally, the injection of
more subjectivity into statistical analyses before inter-
pretation of results of such analyses.
In the face of such problems, persistence of strong
advocacy of Bayesian methods as a substitute for stan-
dard sorts of signiﬁcance testing might be due in part
to ‘a recurring cycle of criticism of classical [frequen-
tist] statistical inference’ (Harris 2005), in which
critics have routinely mistaken misuse of the classical
methods by scientists and statisticians for ﬂaws in the
methods themselves (as documented, e.g. by Abelson
1995, 1997; Hagen 1997; Harris 1997, 2005; Mulaik
et al. 1997; Reichardt & Gollob 1997; Rossi 1997;
Nickerson 2000; Balluerka et al. 2005).That is, Baye-
sian methods might be perceived as a refuge from
problems that either do not exist or have been
exaggerated.
A good introduction to the diversity of opinion on
Bayesian statistics is provided by Berger and Sellke
(1987), Berger (2003), Hubbard and Bayari (2003)
and Dennis (2004), and the commentaries by 15 other
statisticians accompanying those articles,together with
Spanos (1999), Spiegelhalter et al. (2004), Chris-
tensen (2005) and Cox (2006). Recent works on their
use for multi-model inference in ecology include
Dorazio and Johnson (2003), Ellison (2004) and
Hobbs and Hilborn (2006).
CONCLUSIONS
This investigation was undertaken with the simple
objective of calling attention to the misuse of one-
tailed tests in animal behaviour and ecology and of
offering corrective advice. Curiosity as to the origins
and history of the problem soon led us into a
sociostatistical labyrinth, full analysis of which is
reserved for companion articles (Hurlbert & Lom-
bardi 2009 & 2008, upubl.) Delving into the psycho-
logical literature, we found that the simple technical
and philosophical issues involved had been resolved by
1960. Unfortunately the message of key papers by
Kimmel (1957), Goldfried (1959) and Eysenck
(1960) rarely was incorporated into statistics texts or
reference works. Instead the contrary and poorly con-
ceived advice of certain early statistics texts (e.g.
Edwards 1954; McNemar 1955; Siegel 1956) became,
in many disciplines, the conventional wisdom: if the
direction of a result is predicted, use a one-tailed test.
Even most modern statistics books list this ‘prediction’
criterion as a valid one (Appendix S1).Our analysis,in
contrast, supports those few authors who have argued
that prediction is never a valid justiﬁcation for use of
one-tailed tests.The claim that there is ‘interest only’
in results in a particular direction should be acceptable
only if exceptional circumstances make it clear that the
investigator truly would have been willing to disregard
results strongly in the direction supposedly ‘not of
any interest’ and only if such a contrary result would
have been of no interest to science or society as a
whole.
In the end, our animal behaviourist and ecologist
colleagues stand somewhat exculpated, given the
quality of advice available to them (Appendix S1).
They must take more individual responsibility,
however, for evaluating the logical foundations under-
lying the quantitative methodologies they use. The
apparent marked decrease between 1989 and 2005 in
use of one-tailed tests in the two journals analysed
suggests that, on this topic, they have already begun to
do so.
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